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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the problem of ranking Lorenz curves in situations where the Lorenz 
curves intersect and no unambiguous ranking can be attained without introducing weaker ranking 
criteria than first-degree Lorenz dominance. To deal with such situations two alternative sequences of 
nested dominance criteria between Lorenz curves are introduced. At the limit the systems of 
dominance criteria appear to depend solely on the income share of either the worst-off or the best-off 
income recipient. This result suggests two alternative strategies for increasing the number of Lorenz 
curves that can be strictly ordered; one that places more emphasis on changes that occur in the lower 
part of the income distribution and the other that places more emphasis on changes that occur in the 
upper part of the income distribution. Both strategies turn out to depart from the Gini coefficient; one 
requires higher degree of downside and the other higher degree of upside inequality aversion than 
what is exhibited by the Gini coefficient. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the sequences of 
dominance criteria characterize two separate systems of nested subfamilies of inequality measures and 
thus provide a method for identifying the least restrictive social preferences required to reach an 
unambiguous ranking of a given set of Lorenz curves. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the 
introduction of successively more general transfer principles than the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers forms a helpful basis for judging the normative significance of higher degrees of Lorenz 
dominance. The dominance results for Lorenz curves do also apply to generalized Lorenz curves and 
thus provide convenient characterizations of the corresponding social welfare orderings.  
 
 
Keywords: The Lorenz curve, Lorenz dominance, partial orderings, the Gini coefficient, rank-
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In empirical analyses of income distributions it is common practice to make separate comparisons of 
mean incomes and Lorenz curves. The Lorenz curve, which was introduced as a representation of 
inequality, is concerned with income shares without taking account of differences in mean incomes. 
By displaying the deviation of each individual income share from the income share that corresponds to 
perfect equality, the Lorenz curve captures the essential descriptive features of the concept of 
inequality. Thus, adopting the Lorenz curve as a basis for judging between income distributions means 
that we focus solely on distributional aspects. The widespread use of the Lorenz curve in applied work 
shows that focusing on distributional aspects is of interest in its own right2 , irrespective of how 
we judge between level of mean income and degree of inequality in cases where they conflict. For 
welfare judgments about the trade-off between mean income and inequality we refer to Shorrocks 
(1983), Ebert (1987) and Lambert (1985, 1993a).  
 Ranking Lorenz curves in accordance with first-degree Lorenz dominance means that the 
higher of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is preferred. The normative significance of this criterion 
follows from the fact that the higher of two non-intersecting Lorenz curves can be obtained from the 
lower Lorenz curve by means of rank-preserving income transfers from richer to poorer individuals, 
which means that the criterion of first-degree Lorenz dominance is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers. Thus, when one Lorenz curve lies above another the higher Lorenz curve 
displays less inequality than the lower Lorenz curve. However, since Lorenz curves may intersect, 
which is often the case in applied economics, other ranking criteria than first-degree Lorenz 
dominance are needed to reach an unambiguous conclusion. 
 The standard practice for ranking intersecting Lorenz curves is to apply summary measures of 
inequality. However, as it may be difficult to find a single measure that gains a wide degree of 
support, it is of interest to search for alternative ranking criteria that are stronger than single measures 
of inequality and weaker than first-degree Lorenz dominance. To this end two alternative dominance 
criteria emerge as natural candidates; one that aggregates the Lorenz curve from below (second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance) and the other that aggregates the Lorenz curve from above (second-degree 
downward Lorenz dominance). Since first-degree Lorenz dominance implies second-degree upward as 
well as downward Lorenz dominance we have that both methods preserve first-degree Lorenz dominance 
and thus are consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. However, the transfer sensitivity of 
these criteria differ in the sense that second-degree upward Lorenz dominance place more emphasis on 
transfers occurring in the lower rather than in the upper part of the income distribution, whereas second-
degree downward Lorenz dominance is most sensitive to transfers that occur in the upper part of the 
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income distribution. This means that the criterion of second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a 
transfer of money from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the lower it occurs in the income 
distribution, provided that the proportion of individuals between the donors and receivers is fixed. By 
contrast, the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz dominance requires this type of transfer to be 
more equalizing the higher it occurs in the income distribution. 
 The relationship between first- and second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and measurement of 
inequality has been widely discussed in the economic literature. Restricting attention to distributions of 
equal means, Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) observed that first-degree Lorenz dominance and second-
degree stochastic dominance are identical requirements, and thus recognized that the family of inequality 
measures derived from utilitarian social welfare functions with concave utility functions yields a 
characterization of the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves. 3 This result suggests the hypothesis that 
second-degree upward Lorenz dominance imposes the restriction of positive third derivative on the utility 
function of the utilitarian inequality measures, where second-degree upward Lorenz dominance is 
defined analogous to second-degree stochastic dominance. Unfortunately, this hypothesis has to be 
rejected since second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and third-degree stochastic dominance do not 
coincide. However, useful analyses of the implications of third-degree stochastic dominance on 
measurement of inequality and social welfare have been provided by Atkinson (2007), Shorrocks and 
Foster (1987), Dardanoni and Lambert (1988), Davies and Hoy (1995) and Chiu (2007), whilst 
Muliere and Scarsini (1989), Zoli (1999, 2002) have examined the implications of applying second-
degree Lorenz dominance as a criterion for ranking Lorenz curves.  
 While the majority of the results in these papers concerns the case of singly intersecting 
Lorenz curves the latter five papers provide results for the case of multiple crossings as well. 
However, the ranking criterion introduced by Davies and Hoy (1995) requires computation and 
comparison of the coefficient of variation for each of the actual intersections between the Lorenz 
curves being compared. The complexity of this approach may be considered as a drawback and makes 
it less attractive as a practical method for ranking Lorenz curves. By contrast, the results of Muliere 
and Scarsini (1989) and Zoli (1999, 2002) suggest that there may be a closer relationship between 
Lorenz dominance (of various degrees) and rank-dependent measures of inequality than between 
Lorenz dominance and utilitarian measures of inequality. This is due to the fact that rank-dependent 
measures of inequality, as apposed to utilitarian measures of inequality, are explicitly defined in terms 
of the Lorenz curve. 
 
2 See e.g. Atkinson et al. (1995) who make cross-country comparisons of Lorenz curves allowing for differences 
between countries in level of income and Lambert (1993b) for a discussion of applying the criterion of first-
degree Lorenz dominance as a basis for evaluating distributional effects of tax reforms. 
3 See Atkinson (1970) for a discussion and definition of measures of inequality derived from utilitarian welfare 
functions. 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore what restrictions a set of Lorenz dominance criteria places 
on the weight-functions of the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality, and to provide a 
normative justification of these criteria by introducing appropriate general principles of transfer sensitivity. 
As will be demonstrated in Sections 2 and 3, second-degree Lorenz dominance forms a natural basis 
for the construction of two separate hierarchical sequences of partial orderings (dominance criteria), 
where one sequence places emphasize on changes that occur in the lower part of the Lorenz curve 
whereas the other places emphasize on changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve. The 
hierarchical and nested structure of the dominance criteria appears to be useful in empirical 
applications since we are allowed to identify the lowest degree of dominance required to reach 
unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves. Moreover, Section 3 demonstrates that the two hierarchical 
sequences of Lorenz dominance criteria divide the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality 
into two corresponding hierarchical systems of nested subfamilies that offer two different inequality 
aversion profiles; one exhibits successively higher degrees of downside (positional) inequality 
aversion whereas the other exhibits successively higher degrees of upside (positional) inequality 
aversion. Since the various criteria of higher degree Lorenz dominance provide convenient 
computational methods, these results can be used to identify the largest subfamily of the family of 
rank-dependent measures of inequality and thus the least restrictive social preferences required to 
reach unambiguous ranking of any given set of Lorenz curves. Moreover, by considering the scaled-up 
version of the Lorenz curve (the generalized Lorenz curve) it can easily be demonstrated that the 
dominance results for Lorenz curves carry over to generalized Lorenz curves and thus provide 
convenient characterizations of subfamilies of rank-dependent social welfare functions. Thus, the 
results obtained in this paper can for example also be used as a basis for exploring how robust 
empirically identified optimal tax and benefit systems are with respect to choice of rank-dependent 
welfare function.4 Section 4 summarizes the conclusions of the paper and briefly discusses the use of 
the obtained results as a basis for deriving a sequence of dominance criteria for generalized Lorenz 
curves.  
2. LORENZ DOMINANCE OF FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE 
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean μ is defined by 
 L u F t dt u
u
( ) ( ) , ,=  −1 0
0
1
μ
≤ ≤ 1  (1) 
where { }1F (t) inf x : F(x) t− = ≥
                                                     
 is the left inverse of F. Thus, the Lorenz curve L(u) shows the share of 
total income received by the poorest 100 u per cent of the population. Note that F can either be a 
4 See Moffitt (2003) for a recent review of empirical studies that focus on negative income tax and the design of 
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discrete or a continuous distribution function. Although the former is what we actually observe, the 
latter often allows simpler derivation of theoretical results and is a valid large sample approximation. 
Thus, in most cases below F will be assumed to be a continuous distribution function, but the 
assumption of a discrete distribution function will be used where appropriate. 
 Under the restriction of equal mean incomes the problem of ranking Lorenz curves formally 
corresponds to the problem of choosing between uncertain prospects. This relationship has been 
utilized by e.g. Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970) to characterize the criterion of non-intersecting 
Lorenz curves in the case of distributions with equal mean incomes. This was motivated by the fact 
that in cases of equal mean incomes the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is equivalent to 
second-degree stochastic dominance5, which means that the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz 
curves obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers states 
that an income transfer from a richer to a poorer individual reduces income inequality, provided that 
their ranks in the income distribution are unchanged, and is defined formally by6 
 
DEFINITION 2.1. (The Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers.) Consider a discrete income distribution 
F. A transfer 0>δ  from a person with income ( )−1F t  to a person with income ( )−1F s
<
, where the 
transfer is assumed to be rank-preserving, is said to reduce inequality in F when s t  and to raise 
inequality in F when s>t. 
 
To perform inequality comparisons with Lorenz curves we can deal with distributions with equal 
means, or alternatively simply abandon the assumption of equal means and consider distributions of 
relative incomes.7 The latter approach normally forms the basis of empirical studies of income 
inequality. 
 The standard criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves, called first-degree Lorenz 
dominance, is based on the following definition8.   
 
DEFINITION 2.2. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to first-degree dominate a Lorenz curve L2 if 
 [ ]( ) ( ) ,1 2L u L u for all u 0 1≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for some , .u 0 1∈  
                                                                                                                                                                      
welfare programs. 
5 For a proof see Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1934). 
6 Note that this definition of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers was proposed by Fields and Fei (1978). 
7 The importance of focusing on relative incomes was acknowledged already by Plato who proposed that the 
ratio of the top income to the bottom should be less than four to one (see Cowell, (1977)). See also Sen's (1992) 
discussion of relative deprivation and Smith's (1979) discussion of necessities. 
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  In order to examine the relationship between a set of Lorenz dominance criteria and the 
measurement of inequality we will rely on the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality9 
defined by 
 
1 1
1
P
0 0
1J (L) 1 P (u)d L(u) 1 P (u)F (u)du−′ ′= − = −
μ   (2) 
where L is the Lorenz curve of the income distribution F with mean μ and the weight-function  is 
the derivative of a continuous, differentiable and concave function P defined on the unit interval where 
 and . To ensure that JP has the unit interval as its range the condition P (  is 
imposed on P. As demonstrated by Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001) the JP-family represents a 
preference relation defined either on the class of distribution functions (F) or on the class of Lorenz 
curves (L), where P can be interpreted as a preference function of a social decision-maker. The 
preference function P assigns weights to the incomes of the individuals in accordance with their rank 
in the income distribution. Therefore, the functional form of P reveals the attitude towards inequality 
of a social decision-maker who employs JP to judge between Lorenz curves.  
P′
0=P(0) 0= P(1) 1= 1)′
 Note that the welfare economic justification for the family of rank-dependent measures 
defined by (2) is analogous to the justification for Atkinson’s expected utility type of inequality 
measures. The essential differences between these two approaches for measuring inequality and social 
welfare arise from the so-called independence axioms. Whilst the expected utility independence axiom 
requires that the ordering of distributions of individual welfare is invariant with respect to identical 
mixing of the distributions being compared, the rank-dependent independence axiom requires that the 
ordering is invariant with respect to identical mixing of the inverses of the distributions being 
compared. For further discussion, see Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001).  
As demonstrated by Yaari (1988), the JP-family of inequality measures can be used as a basis 
for characterizing first-degree Lorenz dominance. For the sake of completeness the characterization 
result of first-degree Lorenz dominance given by Yaari (1988) is reproduced in Theorem 2.1 below, 
where L denotes the family of Lorenz curves and P1 is a class of preference functions defined by 
 [ ]{ }P1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0= ′ ′′ ′ > ′′ < ∈ ′ =P P and P are continuous on P t and P t for t and P: , , ( ) ( ) , , ( )
                                                                                                                                                                     
. 
8 Note that most analyses of Lorenz dominance apply a definition that excludes the requirement of strict 
inequality for some u. 
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9 Mehran (1976) introduced the JP-family by relying on descriptive arguments, whilst an axiomatic justification 
was provided by Yaari (1988). A slightly different version of JP was introduced by Piesch (1975), whereas 
Giaccardi (1950) considered a discrete version of JP. For alternative normative motivations of the JP-family and 
various subfamilies of the JP-family we refer to Donaldson and Weymark (1980), Weymark (1981) and Aaberge 
(2001). 
THEOREM 2.1. (Fields and Fei (1978) and Yaari (1988)). Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the 
following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 first-degree dominates L2 
(ii) L1 can be obtained from L2 by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers 
(iii) L2 can be obtained from L1 by a sequence of Pigou-Dalton regressive transfers 
(iv) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  for all 1P ∈ P  
 
 We refer to Fields and Fei (1978) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii) (and (iii)) 
and to Yaari (1988) for a proof of the equivalence between (i) and (iv). 
 Atkinson (1970) defined inequality aversion as equivalent to risk aversion in the theory of choice 
under uncertainty. This was motivated by the fact that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is identical to the 
condition of dominating non-intersecting Lorenz curves. Thus, we adopt the following definition. 
 
DEFINITION 2.3. A social decision-maker that supports the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers is said to 
exhibit inequality aversion. 
 
 The characterization of the condition of first-degree Lorenz dominance provided by Theorem 
2.1 shows that non-intersecting Lorenz curves can be ordered without specifying further the functional 
form of the preference function P other than P being strictly concave. This means that JP satisfies the 
Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers for concave P-functions. To deal with situations where Lorenz 
curves intersect a weaker principle than first-degree Lorenz dominance is called for. To this end we 
may employ second-degree upward Lorenz dominance defined by 
 
DEFINITION 2.4A. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree upward dominate a Lorenz curve L2  if  
  [ ]
0
u
1
0
u
2L (t) dt L (t) dt for all u 0,1 ≥ ∈
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1∈ . 
 
 The term upward dominance refers to the fact that the Lorenz curves are aggregated from 
below10. The aggregated Lorenz curve can be considered as a sum of weighted income shares, where 
the weights decrease linearly with increasing rank of the income receiver in the income distribution. 
Thus, a social decision-maker who prefers the second-degree upward dominating of two intersecting 
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10 Note that second-degree upward Lorenz dominance is equivalent to a normalized version of third-degree 
inverse stochastic dominance introduced by Muliere and Scarsini (1989). 
Lorenz curves pays more attention to inequality in the lower than in the upper part of the income 
distribution. An alternative ranking criterion to second-degree upward Lorenz dominance is obtained 
by aggregating the Lorenz curve from above.  
 
DEFINITION 2.4B. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to second-degree downward dominate a Lorenz curve L2  if  
  ( ) ( ) [ ]
1 1
2 1
u u
1 - L (t) dt 1 - L (t) dt for all u 0,1≥ ∈ 
and the inequality holds strictly for some u 0,1∈ . 
 
 Note that second-degree downward as well as upward Lorenz dominance preserves first-
degree Lorenz dominance since first-degree Lorenz dominance implies second-degree upward as well 
as second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. Consequently, both dominance criteria are consistent 
with the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers. The choice between second-degree upward and 
downward Lorenz dominance clarifies whether or not equalizing transfers between poorer individuals 
should be considered more important than those between richer individuals. A social decision-maker 
who favors second-degree upward Lorenz dominance would most likely prefer third-degree upward 
Lorenz dominance to third-degree downward Lorenz dominance, because third-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance places the emphasis on equalizing transfers between poorer individuals, whereas third-
degree downward Lorenz dominance places the emphasis on equalizing transfers between richer 
individuals. 
 To judge the normative significance of the criteria of second-degree upward and downward 
Lorenz dominance, more powerful principles than the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers are needed. 
To this end Kolm (1976) introduced the principle of diminishing transfers11, which for a fixed 
difference in income considers a transfer from a richer to a poorer person to be more equalizing the 
further down in the income distribution it takes place.12 As indicated by Shorrocks and Foster (1987) 
and Muliere and Scarsini (1989) the principle of diminishing transfers is, however, not consistent with 
second-degree upward Lorenz dominance. Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of the 
principle of diminishing transfers by accounting for the difference in the proportion of individuals 
between donors and recipients of the income transfers rather than for the difference in income. The 
principle introduced by Mehran (1976) proves to characterize second-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance. To provide a formal definition of this principle, called the principle of positional transfer 
sensitivity by Zoli (1999), let I be an inequality measure and let ΔΙt(δ,h) denote the change in I 
                                                     
11 Denoted aversion to downside inequality by Davies and Hoy (1995). 
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12 For a formal definition, see Kolm (1976). 
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)
)
)
)
resulting from a transfer δ from a person with income  to a person with income  that 
leaves their ranks in the income distribution F unchanged, where F is assumed to be a discrete 
distribution for a finite population. Hence,  is a negative number for any inequality measure 
that obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers13. Furthermore, let  be defined by 
1F (t h)− + 1F (t)−
(tI ,hΔ δ
(1 s,tI ,hΔ δ
 . (3) ( ) ( ) (1 s,t t sI ,h I ,h I ,hΔ δ = Δ δ − Δ δ
Since the value of associated with a member of the JP – family defined by (2) either can be 
positive or negative, it  will be useful to introduce two alternative versions of the  principle of transfer 
sensitivity. Formal definitions of these principles are given by  
(1 s,tI ,hΔ δ
 
DEFINITION 2.5. Consider a discrete income distribution F, an inequality measure I that obeys the 
Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and rank-preserving transfers 0>δ   from individuals with ranks 
s h+  and t  to individuals with ranks s and t in F. Then the inequality measure I is said to satisfy 
the principle of first-degree downside [upside] positional transfer sensitivity (first-degree DPTS 
[UPTS]) if  [ ]. 
h+
,1 s ( ),tI h 0 when sΔ δ > < t ( ), , < <1 s tI h 0 whenΔ δ s t
 
Figure1. Illustration of DPTS and UPTS 
 
 
Note that the shaded areas of Figure 1 for the density f are identical, which means that the number of 
people located between   and  is equal to the number of people located between 
 and . Since income distributions normally are skewed to the right this means, as is 
1F (s h)− + 1F (s)−
1F (t h)− + 1F (t)−
                                                     
13 For convenience the dependence of I on F is suppressed in the notation for I.  
illustrated by Figure 1, that the income difference between the donor and receiver under the DPTS as 
well as under the UPTS is smaller in the lower than in the upper part of the income distribution.  
Mehran (1976) demonstrated that JP defined by (2) satisfies first-degree DPTS if and only if 
14. Moreover, as stated in Theorem 2.2A below dominance for all JP that satisfy the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers and the first-degree DPTS proves to be equivalent to the condition of second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance. 
P (t) 0′′′ >
  
 Let  be a family of preference functions related to JP and defined by *12P
 [ ]{ }*12 1P : P , P is continuous on 0,1 and P (t) 0 for t 0,1′′′ ′′′= ∈ > ∈P P . 
 The following result provides a characterization of second-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance.15 
 
THEOREM 2.2A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 second-degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( ) *P 1 P 2 12J L J L for all P< ∈P  
(iii) ( ) ( )<P 1 P 2J L J L   for all ∈ 1P P  being such that JP obeys the principle of first-degree DPTS. 
(Proof in Appendix). 
 
 To ensure equivalence between second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and JP-measures as 
decision criteria, Theorem 2.2A shows that it is necessary to restrict the preference functions P to be 
concave with positive third derivatives. If, by contrast, P has negative third derivative, then Theorem 
2.2B yields the downward dominance analogy to Theorem 2.2A. 
 Let  be a family of preference functions related to JP and defined by *22P
 [ ]{ }*22 1P : P , P is continuous on 0,1 and P (t) 0 for t 0,1′′′ ′′′= ∈ < ∈P P . 
 
THEOREM 2.2B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 second-degree downward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( ) *P 1 P 2 22J L J L for all P< ∈P  
(iii) ( ) ( )<P 1 P 2J L J L  for all ∈ 1P P  being such that JP obeys the principle of first-degree UPTS. 
(Proof in Appendix). 
                                                     
14 Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that JP defined by (2) satisfies Kolm's principle of diminishing transfers under 
conditions that depend on the shape of the preference function P as well as on the shape of the income 
distribution F. 
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15 In cases of equal means Proposition 2 of Zoli (1999) and Theorem 2.2A yield identical results.  
 REMARK. It follows from the proofs of Theorem 2.2A and 2.2B that the condition  for all P (t) 0′′ <
t 0,1∈  can be relaxed and replaced by the conditions P  and , respectively. 
Accordingly, the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 2.2A means that any JP with  
obeys the first-degree DPTS independent of whether  is larger or smaller than 0 for 
(1) 0′′ ≤ P (0)′′ ≤ 0
P′′′(t) 0>
P (t)′′ t 0,1∈ .16 A 
similar remark can be made for Theorem 2.2B. Thus, any JP with P  obeys the first-degree 
UPTS. However, the relevance of using measures of inequality that do not obey the Pigou-Dalton of 
transfers  might be questioned. 
(t) < 0′′′
(P (t) 0′′ > )
 
 An inequality averse social decision-maker that supports the criterion of second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance will act in line with the principle of first-degree DPTS and assign more 
weight to changes that take place in the lower part of the Lorenz curve than to changes that occur in 
the upper part of the Lorenz curve. By contrast, the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance emphasizes changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve. Thus, a social 
decision-maker that exhibits inequality aversion and employs the criterion of second-degree 
downward Lorenz dominance will act in favor of the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the 
principle of first-degree UPTS. To characterize social preferences of these types we adopt the 
following definition17. 
 
DEFINITION 2.6. An inequality averse social decision-maker that supports the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers and the principle of first-degree DPTS (UPTS) is said to exhibit downside 
(upside) positional inequality aversion of first-degree. 
 
 Theorems 2.2A and 2.2B demonstrate that the criteria of second-degree upward and 
downward Lorenz dominance can be used to divide JP-measures into wide families of inequality 
measures that differ in the measures' sensitivity to changes (transfers) in the lower or upper part of the 
Lorenz curve. Members of the family { }*P 1J :P ∈P 2  give more weight to changes that take place lower 
down in the Lorenz curve, whereas members of the family { }*P 2J :P∈P
t) 0=
2
                                                     
 give more weight to changes 
higher up in the Lorenz curve. Note that , the P-function that corresponds to the Gini 
coefficient, is neither included in nor in
P t t( ) 2
*
22P
t= − 2
*
12P  . Since  for all t, the Gini coefficient neither 
preserves second-degree upward Lorenz dominance nor second-degree downward Lorenz 
P (′′′
16 See Chateauneuf et al. (2002) for an alternative proof of this result. 
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17 For an alternative definition of downside inequality aversion see Chiu (2007). 
dominance.18 Thus, the suggestion of Muliere and Scarsini (1989) that the Gini coefficient is coherent 
with second-degree upward Lorenz dominance requires a definition of second-degree Lorenz 
dominance that abandons the condition of strict inequality (for some u 0,1∈ ).  
 
3. LORENZ DOMINANCE OF Ith- DEGREE 
 Since situations where second-degree (upward or downward) Lorenz dominance does not provide 
unambiguous ranking of Lorenz curves may arise, it will be useful to introduce weaker dominance criteria 
than second-degree Lorenz dominance. To this end we will introduce two hierarchical sequences of nested 
Lorenz dominance criteria; one departs from second-degree upward Lorenz dominance and the other from 
second-degree downward Lorenz dominance. As explained in Section 2, the choice between second-
degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance clarifies whether focus is turned to changes that take 
place in the lower or upper part of the income distribution. Thus, a person who favors second-degree 
upward Lorenz dominance would most likely prefer third-degree and higher degrees of upward Lorenz 
dominance to third-degree and higher degrees of downward Lorenz dominance. Conversely, when the 
value judgment of a person is consistent with the criterion of second-degree downward Lorenz 
dominance, higher degrees of downward Lorenz dominance are likely more acceptable than higher 
degrees of upward Lorenz dominance  
 As will become evident below it is convenient to use the following notation, 
 ( )
u u
2 1
0 0
1L (u) L(t)dt u t F (t)dt, 0 u 1,−= = − ≤
μ  ≤  (4) 
  
u
i 1 i
0
L (u) L (t)dt, 0 u 1, i 2,3,...,+ = ≤ ≤ =
and 
 ( ) ( )
1 1
2
u u
1L (u) 1 L(t) dt t u F (t)dt, 0 u 1,−= − = − ≤ ≤
μ  1
                                                     
 (5) 
  
1
i 1 i
u
L (u) L (t)dt, 0 u 1, i 2,3,....+ = ≤ ≤ = 
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18 Aaberge (2000) gave an alternative interpretation of this property by demonstrating that the Gini coefficient 
attaches an equal weight to a given transfer irrespective of where it takes place in the income distribution, as 
long as the income transfer occurs between individuals with the same difference in ranks. 
 Now, using integration by parts, we obtain the following alternative expressions for Li+1 and 
, respectively, i 1L +
 ( ) ( ) ( )
u u
i 1 ii 1 1
0 0
1 1L (u) u t L(t)dt u t F (t)dt, i 2,3,...
i 1 ! i!
−+
= − = − =
− μ  −  (6) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
i 1 ii 1 1
u u
1 1L (u) t u 1 L(t) dt t u F (t)dt, i 2,3,... .
i 1 ! i!
−+ −
= − − = − =
− μ   (7) 
It is easily verified that Li+1(1) defined by (6) is a linear transformation of a measure of inequality that 
belongs to the extended Gini family of inequality measures19 { }:iG i 1≥ , 
 ( ) ( )
i 1
i
1L (1) 1 G (L) , i 1,2,...
i 1 !
+
= − =
+
 (8) 
where 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 i 1 ii
0 0
1G (L) 1 i i 1 1 u L(u)du 1 F(x) 1 1 F(x) dx, i 1.
∞
−
= − + − = − − − ≥
μ   (9) 
Moreover, from the definition (7) of  we get that L
 ( ) ( )
i 1
i
1L (0) i D (L) 1 , i 1,2,...
i 1 !
+
= +
+

=  (10) 
where 
 ( ) ( )1 i 1 ii
0 0
1D (L) 1 i 1 u L(u)du F(x) 1 F (x) dx, i 1,2,...
i
∞
−
= − + = − =
μ   (11) 
and { }iD : i 1,2,...=  is an alternative “generalized” Gini family of inequality measures denoted the 
Lorenz family of inequality measures20, where  is equal to the Gini coefficient. 1D G= 1
                                                     
 As was demonstrated by Aaberge (2000) there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
subfamilies of the extended Gini and the Lorenz families of inequality measures shown by the 
following equation 
19 The extended Gini family of inequality measures was introduced by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and 
Yitzhaki (1983). 
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20 The Lorenz family of inequality measures was introduced by Aaberge (2000) and proves to be a subclass of 
the "illfare-ranked single-series Ginis" discussed by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Bossert (1990). 
 ( ) ( )i ki
k 1
i kG (L) 1 i 1 ( 1) 1 D (L) , i 1,2,...
k k 1
=
 
= + + − − = 
+  k . (12) 
Thus, the extended Gini subfamily { }iG (L) : i 1,2,..., r=  is uniquely determined by the corresponding 
Lorenz subfamily { }iD (L) : i 1,2,...= , r  for any integer r. 
 Expressions (6) and (7) show that Li+1 places more weight on changes in the lower and  on 
changes in the upper part of the Lorenz curve as i increases.  
i 1L +
 As generalizations of Definitions 2.4A and 2.4B we introduce the notions of ith-degree upward 
and downward Lorenz dominance21. Note that subscripts i and j in the notation  and ijL
i
jL  used below 
refer to dominance of ith-degree for Lorenz curve Lj and that  is the Lorenz curve Lj and . 1jL
1
j jL 1 L= −
 
DEFINITION 3.1A. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to ith-degree upward dominate a Lorenz curve L2 if  
 [ ]i i1 2L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1u ∈ . 
 
DEFINITION 3.1B. A Lorenz curve L1 is said to ith-degree downward dominate a Lorenz curve L2 if  
 [ ]i i2 1L (u) L (u) for all u 0,1≥ ∈   
and the inequality holds strictly for some 0,1u ∈ . 
 
 Note that ( -degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance are less restrictive 
dominance criteria than ith-degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance and thus can prove to be 
useful decision criteria in situations where ith-degree dominance does not yield an unambiguous 
ranking of Lorenz curves. 
)i th+ 1
 It follows from the definitions (6) and (7) of Li and  that iL
   implies   i i1 2L (u) L (u) for all u≥
i 1 i 1
1 2L (u) L (u) for all u ,
+ +≥
and that 
   implies  , i i2 1L (u) L (u) for all u≥  i 1 i 12 1L (u) L (u) for all u+ +≥ 
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21 A similar definition of ith degree (upward) inverse stochastic dominance was introduced by Muliere and 
Scarsini (1989). Note that Definitions 3.1A and 3.1B do not require any restrictions on the Lorenz curves (or the 
distribution functions) and thus differ in this sense from the definitions of stochastic dominance proposed by 
Whitmore (1970) and Chew (1983). 
which means that -degree upward Lorenz dominance preserves ith-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance and that ( -degree downward Lorenz dominance preserves ith-degree downward 
Lorenz dominance. 
( )thi 1+
i 1+ )th
 Thus, the various degrees of upward and downward Lorenz dominance form two separate 
sequences of nested dominance criteria, which turn out to be useful for dividing the JP-family of 
inequality measures into nested subfamilies. To this end it will be convenient to introduce the 
following notation. Let P(j) denote the jth derivative of P and let  be 
families of preference functions defined by 
* ** *** * ** ***
1i 1i 1i 1i 2i 2i 2i 2i, , , , , , ,P P P P P P P P
 ( ) [ ]{ }i 1 ( j)1i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 and P (1) 0, j 2,3,...,i+= ∈ = =P P , 
 { }* j ( j 1)1i 1iP : P and ( 1) P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i+= ∈ − > ∈ =P P , 
 ( ){ }i 1** i1i 1iP : P and ( 1) P (t) 0 for t 0,1+= ∈ − > ∈P P , 
( ) [ ] ( ){ }i 1 i 1*** i j 1 ( j)1i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 , ( 1) P (t) 0 for t 0,1 and ( 1) P (1) 0, j 2,3,...,i ,+ + −= ∈ − > ∈ − ≥ =P P
 
 ( ) [ ]{ }i 1 ( j)2i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 and P (0) 0, j 2,3,...,i+= ∈ = =P P , 
 { }* ( j 1)2i 2iP : P and P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i+= ∈ < ∈ =P P , 
 ( ){ }i 1**2i 2iP : P and P (t) 0 for t 0,1+= ∈ < ∈P P , 
 ( ) [ ] ( ){ }i 1 i 1*** ( j)2i 1P : P ,P is continuous on 0,1 , P (t) 0 for t 0,1 and P (0) 0, j 2,3,...,i+ += ∈ < ∈ ≤ =P P , 
respectively. Note that  and . * ** *1i 1i 1i⊂ ⊂P P P
** *** ** *
2i 2i 2i⊂ ⊂P P P
 The subfamilies of the JP-family formed by  are characterized by the following 
theorems. 
** **
1i 2iandP P
 
THEOREM 3.1A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 ith-degree upward dominates L2. 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ **P 1 P 2 1iJ L J L for all P P . 
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(Proof in Appendix). 
 
THEOREM 3.1B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 ith-degree downward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ **P 1 P 2 2iJ L J L for all P P . 
(Proof in Appendix). 
 
 The set of Lorenz dominance criteria offers convenient computational methods for applied 
work. As is demonstrated by Theorems 3.1A and 3.1B this approach is particular attractive since it 
provides identification of the restrictions on the preference function P that are needed to reach 
unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves.22 Note that Theorem 3.1A can be employed for the extended 
Gini family since the inequality measure Gk satisfies the conditions , whereas 
Theorem 3.1B can be employed for the Lorenz family of inequality measures since the measure Dk 
satisfies the conditions .  
jP (1) 0, j 2,3,...,k= =
( j)P (0) 0, j 2,3,...,k= =
 To judge the normative significance of ith-degree upward and downward Lorenz dominance, it 
appears helpful to strengthen the principles of first-degree downside and upside positional transfer 
sensitivity to be more sensitive to transfers that take place lower down (higher up) in the income 
distribution. To this end it will be useful to introduce the following notation. Let  be 
defined by 
( )2 s,t 1 2I ,h ,hΔ δ
  (13) ( ) ( ) (
2 22 s,t 1 2 1 s,t 1 1 s h ,t h 1
I ,h ,h I ,h I ,h+ +Δ δ = Δ δ − Δ δ )
where  is defined by (3). 1 s,tI ( ,h)Δ δ
 
DEFINITION 3.3. Consider a discrete income distribution F, an inequality measure I that obeys the 
first-degree DPTS [UPTS], and rank-preserving transfers 0>δ  from individuals with ranks 1s h+ , 
1 2s h h+ + , , and  respectively to individuals with ranks s, 1t h+ 1t h h+ + 2 + 2s h , t and t  in F. 
Then I is said to satisfy the principle of second-degree downside [upside] positional transfer 
sensitivity, the second-degree DPTS [UPTS] , if 
+ 2h
 [ ]. ( ), , ,2 s t 1 2I h h 0 when sΔ δ > < t ( ), , ,2 s t 1 2I h h 0 when sΔ δ > < t
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Note that ith-degree DPTS can be considered as an alternative to ith-degree transfer principle 
introduced by Fishburn and Willig (1984).23  
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0
0
 Observe that  for any  when I obeys the first-degree UPTS. Since the principle 
of second-degree UPTS is meant to strengthen the principle of first-degree UPTS, it follows from (13) 
that this is obtained when  for . Thus, we can only discern between second-degree 
DPTS and second-degree UPTS if these principles are required to be linked to first-degree DPTS and 
first-degree UPTS, respectively. When a sequence of first-degree DPTS [UPTS] transfers is valued 
more the lower down (higher up) the sequence of the transfers occurs, the sequence of transfers is 
made in line with the principle of second-degree downside [upside] positional transfer sensitivity. To 
provide a formal definition of -degree DPTS [UPTS]  it is convenient to introduce the notation 
 defined by 
1 s,tIΔ <
Δ
s t<
s2 s,tI >
( )thi 1−
t<
( )i s,t 1 2 iI ,h ,h ,...,hΔ δ
  (14) ( ) ( ) ( )
i ii s,t 1 2 i i 1 s,t 1 2 i 1 i 1 s h ,t h 1 2 i 1
I ,h ,h ,...,h I ,h ,h ,...,h I ,h ,h ,...,h , i 3,4,...
− − − + + −Δ δ = Δ δ − Δ δ =
 
DEFINITION 3.4. Consider a discrete income distribution F, an inequality measure I that obeys the 
-degree DPTS [UPTS], and rank-preserving transfers δ from individuals with ranks ( )− thi 1 + 1s h , 
+ + + +1 2 1 is h h ,...,s h h ,...,  + + + +1 2 is h h ... h
+ + +3 i 2... h ,t ,t h ,...,t
( )2 ih ,h ,...,h 0 when
, + 1t h ,
+ ih ,...,t
s t> <
    
respectively to individuals with ranks s, 
 in F. Then I is said to satisfy 
the principle of ith-degree downside [upside] positional transfer sensitivity, the ith-degree DPTS 
[UPTS], if  [( ]. 
+ + + +1 2 1 it h h ,...,t h h ,...,
+ + + +2 3 ih h ... h
( )− >i i s ,t 1 2 i1 ) I ,h ,h ,...,h 0Δ δ
+ +1 2t h h
when s t
+ +... hi
<
                                                                                                                                                                     
+s h ,... + + +2 i 2,s h ,...,s h h
i s ,t 1I ,Δ δ
 
 The motivation for introducing the principle of ( -degree DPTS [UPTS] was to 
strengthen the principle of ( -degree DPTS [UPTS]. Hence, if a measure of inequality satisfies 
the principle of ( -degree DPTS [UPTS], then it also satisfies the Pigou-Dalton principle of 
transfers and the principles of DPTS [UPTS] of each degree up to i - 2. Thus, the general transfer 
)thi 1−
)thi 2−
)thi 1−
 
*
1iP
22Muliere and Scarsini (1989) provided a characterization of ith-degree (upward) inverse stochastic dominance in 
terms of order conditions for a particular subfamily of . Note, however, that their result cannot be used as a 
basis for identifying what restrictions ith-degree upward Lorenz dominance (inverse stochastic dominance) 
impose on the preference function P. 
23 Fishburn and Willig (1984) introduced an extension of Kolm’s principle of diminishing transfers to higher-
order transfer principles and demonstrated that these principles are associated to higher orders of (upward) 
stochastic dominance. 
 
principles DPTS [UPTS] give increasing weights to transfers at the lower [upper] part of the income 
distribution as i increases. As stated in Theorems 3.2A and 3.2B, support of the principle of ( ) -
degree DPTS is equivalent to be in favor of the criterion of ith-degree upward Lorenz dominance, 
whereas support of the principle of ( -degree UPTS is equivalent to be in favor of ith-degree 
downward Lorenz dominance.  
thi 1−
)thi 1−
*
1i
 
THEOREM 3.2A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 ith-degree upward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈P 1 P 2J L J L for all P P  
(iii) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  for all  being such that JP obeys the principle of (i-1)th-degree DPTS. 
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1iPP ∈
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
THEOREM 3.2B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 ith-degree downward dominates L2 
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈P 1 P 2J L J L for all P *2iP  
(iii) ( ) ( )P 1 P 2J L J L<  for all 2iPP ∈  being such that JP obeys the principle of (i-1)th-degree UPTS 
. 
 The proof of Theorem 3.2B can be achieved by following the line of reasoning used in the 
proof of Theorem 3.2.A. 
 To characterize social preferences that are consistent with DPTS [UPTS] we adopt the 
following definition. 
 
DEFINITION 3.5. A social decision-maker that supports the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and 
the principles of DPTS (UPTS) up to and including ith-degree is said to exhibit downside (upside) 
positional inequality aversion of ith-degree. 
 
 By adding the condition of dominating extended Gini coefficients Gk for  to the 
condition of ith-degree upward Lorenz dominance it follows from the proof of Theorem 3.1A that the 
conditions  can be replaced by less restrictive conditions for P, which means that 
the subfamily of JP-measures that preserves a “restricted” ith-degree upward Lorenz dominance 
k 1,2,...,i= 1−
( j)P (1) 0, j 2,3,...,i= =
condition is larger than the subfamily of JP-measures that preserves ith-degree upward Lorenz 
dominance. Moreover, as indicated above, the latter is a subfamily of the former.24  
 
THEOREM 3.3A. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 ith-degree upward dominates L2 and  for  ( ) ( )≤k 1 k 2G L G L = −k 1,2,...,i 1
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ ***P 1 P 2 1iJ L J L for all P P . 
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
THEOREM 3.3B. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i) L1 ith-degree downward dominates L2 and ( ) ( )≤ =k 1 k 2 −D L D L for k 1,2,...,i 1  
(ii) ( ) ( )< ∈ ***P 1 P 2 2iJ L J L for all P P .  
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
 The proposed sequences of dominance criteria along with the results of Theorems 3.1A-3.3A 
and 3.1B-3.3B suggest two alternative strategies for increasing the number of Lorenz curves that can 
be strictly ordered by successively narrowing the class of inequality measures under consideration. As 
the dominance criteria of each sequence are nested these strategies also allow us to identify the value 
judgments that are needed to reach an unambiguous ranking of Lorenz curves. It follows from 
Theorem 3.2A that JP-measures derived from P-functions with derivatives between second and ith 
order that alternate in sign  preserve upward Lorenz dominance of all 
degrees lower than and equal to i-1. Thus, as demonstrated by Theorem 3.2A their sensitivity to 
changes that occur in the lower part of the income distribution (and the Lorenz curve) increases as i 
increases. By contrast, Theorem 3.2B shows that JP-measures derived from P-functions with negative 
derivatives of order two and up to i (  preserve downward Lorenz dominance of 
all degrees lower than and equal to i-1. Theorem 3.2B demonstrates that this means that they increase 
their sensitivity to changes that occur in the upper part of the Lorenz curve as i increases. Note that the 
above theorems are only valid for finite i. At the extreme, as i , observe that 
( )( )− > =−1 0 2 31j jP t j i( ) ( ) , , , ... ,
)P t jj( ) ( ) , , , ... ,< =0 2 3 i
→ ∞
 ( ) i 1 1
0, 0 u 1
i 1 !L (u) F (0 ) , u 1
+
−
≤ <
+ → +
= μ
 (15) 
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24 Wang and Young (1998) provide a result similar to Theorem 3.3B for intersecting distribution functions. 
However, their result relies on the condition of negative derivatives (up to order i) of P whereas the condition for 
P used in Theorem 3.3B is less strict. Moreover, Wang and Young (1998) don’t appear to be aware of the fact 
that their result concerns downward rather than upward inverse stochastic dominance. 
and 
 ( )
1
i 1
F (1) , u 0
i 1 !L (u)
0, 0 u 1,
−
+

=
+ → μ < ≤
  (16) 
where F-1(0+) and F-1(1) denote the lowest and highest income, respectively. Hence, at the limit 
upward and downward Lorenz dominance solely depend on the income share of the worst-off and 
best-off income recipient, respectively. At the extreme upward Lorenz dominance is solely concerned 
with transfers that benefit the poorest unit. By contrast, downward Lorenz dominance solely focuses 
on transferring money from the richest to anyone else. 
 
 REMARK. Restricting the comparisons of Lorenz curves to distributions with equal means the 
various dominance results of Sections 2 and 3 are valid for generalized Lorenz curves and also apply 
to the so-called dual theory representation for choice under uncertainty introduced by Yaari (1988). 
4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 This paper introduces two sequences of partial orderings for achieving complete rankings of 
Lorenz curves. In particular, we have examined situations where Lorenz curves intersect by 
introducing various ranking criteria that are weaker than non-intersecting dominance (first-degree 
Lorenz dominance) and stronger than single measures of inequality. The proposed set of dominance 
criteria is shown to characterize nested subsets of the families of inequality measures defined by 
where P' is the derivative of a function P that defines the inequality aversion profile of 
the inequality measure. The condition of first-degree Lorenz dominance corresponds to concave P-
functions. By introducing higher degrees of dominance, this paper provides a method for identifying 
the lowest degree of dominance and the weakest restriction on the functional form of the preference 
function P that is needed to reach unambiguous rankings of Lorenz curves, irrespective of whether 
one’s social preferences is consistent with downside or upside postional inequality aversion. To judge 
the normative significance of the sequences of dominance criteria, appropriate principles of transfers 
have been introduced. The set of Lorenz dominance criteria provides convenient computational 
methods for ranking a set of Lorenz curves and for exploring how robust the attained ranking would 
be with respect to choice of rank-dependent measures of inequality. Thus, in applied work the ranking 
obtained by applying this approach should in general have a wider degree of support than that 
obtained by applying arbitrarily chosen summary measures of inequality.  
 ′P u d L u( ) ( )
 To deal with the mean income income inequality trade-off, in cases where they conflict, 
Shorrocks (1983) introduced the “generalized Lorenz curve”, defined as a mean scaled-up version of 
the Lorenz curve. Moreover, Shorrocks (1983) obtained characterizations of social welfare functions 
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based on first-degree dominance relations between generalized Lorenz curves. Scaling up the 
introduced Lorenz dominance relations of this paper by the mean income (μ) and replacing the rank-
dependent measures of inequality JP defined by (2) with the rank-dependent social welfare functions 
WP = μ(1− JP), it can be demonstrated that the present results also apply to the generalized Lorenz 
curve and moreover provide convenient characterizations of the corresponding social welfare 
orderings. Accordingly, the obtained dominance and characterization results may e.g. form a helpful 
basis for exploring the robustness of empirically identified optimal tax and welfare regimes with 
respect to choice of rank-dependent welfare function and the corresponding degree of positional 
inequality aversion. Thus, the social evaluation framework proposed in this paper can be considered as 
an extension and improvement of the social evaluation methods that are based on selected measures of 
inequality from the Atkinson or the generalized Gini family of inequality measures. 
APPENDIX 
Proofs of Dominance Results 
 
LEMMA 1. Let H be the family of bounded, continuous and non-negative functions on [0,1] which are 
positive on 0,1 and let g be an arbitrary bounded and continuous function on [0,1]. Then 
   > ∈g(t) h(t) dt 0 for all h H
implies 
  [ ]g(t) 0 for all t 0,1≥ ∈
and the inequality holds strictly for at least one t 0 1∈ , .  
 
 The proof of Lemma 1 is known from mathematical textbooks. 
 The proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2.2A is analogous to the proof 
for stochastic dominance in Hadar and Russel (1969) but is included below for the sake of 
completeness. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2.2A. Using integration by parts we have that 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )J L J L P L u L u du P u L t L t dt duP P
u
2 1
0
1
1 2
0
1
0
1 21− = − ′′ − + ′′′ −  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
Thus, if (i) holds then  for all  ( ) ( )J L J LP P2 > 1 *12P .∈P
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.
) )
)
1
)
 To prove the converse statement we restrict to preference functions  for which 
. Hence, 
*
12P∈P
′′ =P ( )1 0
  ( ) ( ) ( )J L J L P u L t L t dt duP P
u
2 1
0
1
0
1 2− = ′′′ − ( ) ( ) ( )
and the desired result it obtained by applying Lemma 1. 
 To prove the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) consider a case where we transfer a small 
amount γ from persons with incomes  and  to persons with incomes  and 
, respectively, where t is assumed to be larger than s. Then JP defined by (2) obeys the first-
degree DPTS if and only if 
(1 1F s h− + (1 1F t h− + 1F (s)−
1F (t)−
  ( ) (1 1P (s) P s h P (t) P t h′ ′ ′ ′− + > − +
which for small h1 is equivalent to 
 . P (t) P (s) 0′′ ′− >
Next, inserting for , we find, for small h2, that this is equivalent to . 2t s h= + P (s) 0′′′ >
 
 The proof of Theorem 2.2B is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.2A and is based on the 
expression 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
P 2 P 1 1 2 1 2
0 0 u
J L J L P (0) L (t) L (t) dt P (u) L (t) L (t) dt du′′ ′′′− = − − − −  
which is obtained by using integration by parts. Thus, by arguments like those in the proof of Theorem 
2.2A the results of Theorem 2.2B are obtained. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3.1A. To examine the case of ith-degree upward Lorenz dominance we integrate 
 by parts i times, ( ) ( )J L J LP P2 −
  (A1) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1i j 1 ( j) j j i (i 1) i iP 2 P 1 1 2 1 2
j 2 0
J L J L ( 1) P (1) L (1) L (1) ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du− +
=
− = − − + − − 
and use this expression in constructing the proof of the equivalence between (i) and (ii). 
 Assume first that (i) in Theorem 3.1A is true, i.e. 
 [ ]i i1 2L (u) L (u) 0 for all u 0,1− ≥ ∈  
and > holds for at least one u 0,1∈ . 
 Then  for all  ( ) ( )J L J LP P2 > 1 **1iP .∈ P
 Conversely, assume that 
  ( ) ( ) **P 2 P 1 1iJ L J L for all P .> ∈P
For this family of preference functions we have that 
  ( ) ( ) ( )1i (i 1) i iP 2 P 1 1 2
0
J L J L ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du.+− = − −
Then, as demonstrated by Lemma 1, the desired result can be obtained by a suitable choice of .  **1iP∈P
 
 Proof of Theorem 3.2A. Assume that (i) in Theorem 3.2A is true, i.e. 
 [ ]i i1 2L (u) L (u) 0 for all u 0,1− ≥ ∈  
and > holds for at least one u 0,1∈ . Then it follows from Theorem 3.1A that  for 
all  such that 
( ) ( )P 2 P 1J L J L>
i1P∈P ( ) ( )j j 11 P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i+− > ∈ =  since this family of P-functions is a 
subfamily of . **1iP
 Conversely, assume that  for all  such that ( ) ( )P 2 P 1J L J L> 1iP∈ P
( ) ( )j j 11 P (t) 0 for t 0,1 , j 1,2,...,i+− > ∈ = . For this family of P-functions we have that 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1i i 1 i iP 2 P 1 1 2
0
J L J L 1 P (u) L (u) L (u) du+− = − −
and the desired result is obtained by applying Lemma 1. 
 A proof by mathematical induction will be used to prove the equivalence between (ii) and (iii). 
To this end it is convenient to introduce the following notation. Let H1, H2 and  be defined by j 1H +
 , (A2) ( ) (1 1 1H v,h P (v) P v h′ ′= − + )
)1
−
=
  (A3) ( ) ( ) (2 1 1 1 1H s, t,h H s,h H t,h= −
and 
 . (A4) ( ) ( ) ( )j 1 1 2 j j 1 2 j 1 j j j 1 2 j 1H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s h , t h ,h ,h ,...,h , j 2,3,...+ −= − + +
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Moreover, let 
 ( ) (
1
(1)
2 2h 0
1
1H s, t lim H s, t,h
h→
= )1  (A5) 
and 
 ( ) (
j 1
( j)
j 1 j 1 1 2 jjh 0 h 0
k
k 1
1H s, t lim ... lim H s, t,h ,h ,...,h
h
+ +
→ →
=
=
∏
)
t<
. (A6) 
 It follows from Theorems 2.1 and 2.2A that JP obeys the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers 
and the first-degree DPTS iff  and . From (13), definition (2) of JP and (A2)-(A6) 
we then get that JP obeys the second-degree DPTS iff  
P (t) 0′′ < P (t) 0′′′ >
 . (A7) ( )(2)3H s, t 0 for s>
Inserting for (A4), (A3) and (A2) in (A6) for  yields j 2=
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) }
2 1
2 1
2
2
(2)
3 3 1 2h 0 h 0
1 2
2 1 2 2 2 1h 0 h 0
1 2
(1) (1)
2 2 2 2h 0
2
1 1h 0
2 1
2 1 2 2 1 2
1H s, t lim lim H s, t,h ,h
h h
1lim lim H s, t,h H s h , t h ,h
h h
1lim H s, t H s h , t h
h
1 1lim lim P (s) P s h P (t) P t h
h h
P s h P s h h P t h P t h h
lim
→ →
→ →
→
→
= =
− + + =
− + + =
′ ′ ′ ′
− + − − + −
 ′ ′ ′ ′+ − + + − + − + + = 
( ) ( )( )
2
(3) (3)
2 2h 0
2
1 P (s) P s h P (t) P t h P (s) P (t).
h→
 ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′
− + + − − − + = − 
 
Inserting for , we find, for small h, that this is equivalent to . t s h= + (4)P (s) 0<
 Next, assume that 
 . (A8) ( ) ( ) ( ) (j 1j 1 ( j) ( j)jH s, t 1 P (s) P (t)−− = − − )
It follows from Theorem 2.2A and the proof above that (A8) is true for j equal to 2 and 3. 
 Inserting for (A4) in (A6) we get 
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 ( ) ( ) (( ))
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
j 1
j 2
j
( j)
j 1 j 1 2 j 1 j j j 1 2 j 1jh 0 h 0
k
k 1
(1) (1)
j 2 3 j 1 j j 2 3 j 1jh 0 h 0
k
k 2
j 1 j 1
j j j jh 0
j
1H s, t 1lim ... lim H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s h , t h ,h ,h ,...,h
h
1lim ... lim H s, t,h ,h ,...,h H s h , t h ,h ,h ,...,h
h
1lim H s, t H s h , t h ,
h
+ −
→ →
=
− −
→ →
=
− −
→
= − + +
− + + =
− + +
∏
∏
−
=
)
t
 
which by inserting for (A8) yields 
 . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )j j 1 j 1( j)j 1H s, t 1 P (s) P (t)+ ++ = − −
Thus, (A8) is proved to be true by induction. 
 Since JP defined by (2) obeys the ( th-degree DPTS if and only if i 1−
  ( ) ( )i 1iH s, t 0 for s− > <
we get from (A8) that this condition is equivalent to 
 . ( ) ( )i i 11 P (s) 0+− >
 
 Proof of Theorem 3.3A. By inserting for (8) in (A1) we get that 
 . (A9) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1i i 1j 1 ( j) i i iP 2 P 1 j 1 2 j 1 1 1 2
j 2 0
J L J L ( 1) P (1) G L G L ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du+−
− −
=
− = − − + − − 
Assume first that (i) of Theorem 3.3A is true. Then  for all . ( ) ( )P 2 P 1J L J L> ***1iP∈P
 Conversely, assume that 
 . ( ) ( ) ***P 2 P 1 1iJ L J L for all P> ∈P
Then this statement holds for the subfamily of  for which  for . For this 
particular family of preference functions we get that 
***
1iP
( j)P (1) 0= j 2,3,...,i=
 . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 i 1i i iP 2 P 1 1 2
0
J L J L ( 1) P (u) L (u) L (u) du+− = − −
By applying Lemma 1 we get that L1 ith-degree upward dominates L2. 
 Next, consider the subfamily of preference functions defined by 
 
 
25
 . (A10) ( )k 1kP (t) 1 1 t , k 1,2,...,i 1+= − − = −
By observing that  we find by inserting for (A10) in JP that ***k 1iP ∈ P
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
k kP 2 P 1 k 2 k 1
0 J L J L G L G L< − = −
for . k 1,2,...,i 1= −
 
 The proofs of Theorems 3.1B, 3.2B and 3.3B can be constructed by following exactly the 
line of reasoning used in the proofs of Theorems 3.1A and 3.3A. The proofs use the following 
expression, 
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)  (A11) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1i ( j) j j (i 1) i iP 2 p 1 2 1 2 1
j 2 0
J L J L P (0) L (0) L (0) P (u) L (u) L (u) du ,+
=
− = − − − −    
which is obtained by using integration by parts i times. 
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